Epistemic value in the subpersonal vale.
A vexing problem in contemporary epistemology—one with origins in Plato's Meno—concerns the value of knowledge, and in particular, whether and how the value of knowledge exceeds the value of mere (unknown) true opinion. The recent literature is deeply divided on the matter of how best to address the...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 198; no. 10; pp. 9243 - 9273 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Oct2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=152559353&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 152559353 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2021 vid: 198 iid: 10 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 152559353 10.1007/s11229-020-02631-1 ppf: 9243 ppct: 30 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 383KB tig: atl: Epistemic value in the subpersonal vale. aug: au: Carter, J. Adam Rupert, Robert D. affil: University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK University of Colorado, Boulder, Boulder, USA su: Plato, 428-347 B.C. Cognition Virtue epistemology Theory of knowledge Cognitive science Philosophy of science sug: subj: Plato, 428-347 B.C. Cognition Virtue epistemology Theory of knowledge Cognitive science Philosophy of science keyword: Epistemic value Philosophy of cognitive science Subpersonal cognition ab: A vexing problem in contemporary epistemology—one with origins in Plato's Meno—concerns the value of knowledge, and in particular, whether and how the value of knowledge exceeds the value of mere (unknown) true opinion. The recent literature is deeply divided on the matter of how best to address the problem. One point, however, remains unquestioned: that if a solution is to be found, it will be at the personal level, the level at which states of subjects or agents, as such, appear. We take exception to this orthodoxy, or at least to its unquestioned status. We argue that subpersonal states play a significant—arguably, primary—role in much epistemically relevant cognition and thus constitute a domain in which we might reasonably expect to locate the "missing source" of epistemic value, beyond the value attached to mere true belief. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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