Determinism and General Relativity.

We investigate the fate of determinism in general relativity (GR), comparing the philosopher's account with the physicist's well-posed initial value formulations. The fate of determinism is interwoven with the question of what it is for a spacetime to be 'physically reasonable'. A central concern is...

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Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 88; no. 4; pp. 638 - 665
Autores principales: Smeenk, Chris, Wüthrich, Christian
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Oct2021
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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          Smeenk, Chris
          Wüthrich, Christian
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        Spacetime
        Physicists
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        Censorship
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        General relativity (Physics)
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          Spacetime
          Physicists
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          General relativity (Physics)
      ab: We investigate the fate of determinism in general relativity (GR), comparing the philosopher's account with the physicist's well-posed initial value formulations. The fate of determinism is interwoven with the question of what it is for a spacetime to be 'physically reasonable'. A central concern is the status of global hyperbolicity, a putatively necessary condition for determinism in GR. While global hyperbolicity may fail to be true of all physically reasonable models, we analyze whether global hyperbolicity should be (i) imposed by fiat; (ii) established from weaker assumptions, as in cosmic censorship theorems; or (iii) justified by beyond-GR physics.
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