Theory choice, non-epistemic values, and machine learning.
I use a theorem from machine learning, called the "No Free Lunch" theorem (NFL) to support the claim that non-epistemic values are essential to theory choice. I argue that NFL entails that predictive accuracy is insufficient to favor a given theory over others, and that NFL challenges our ability to...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 198; no. 11; pp. 11081 - 11102 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Nov2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=152624466&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 152624466 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Nov2021 vid: 198 iid: 11 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 152624466 10.1007/s11229-020-02773-2 ppf: 11081 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 362KB tig: atl: Theory choice, non-epistemic values, and machine learning. aug: au: Dotan, Ravit affil: UC Berkeley (Philosophy), Berkeley, CA, USA su: National Football League Machine learning Virtue epistemology Machine theory Philosophy of science sug: subj: National Football League Machine learning Virtue epistemology Machine theory Philosophy of science keyword: Epistemic values General philosophy of science No free lunch theorem Theory choice ab: I use a theorem from machine learning, called the "No Free Lunch" theorem (NFL) to support the claim that non-epistemic values are essential to theory choice. I argue that NFL entails that predictive accuracy is insufficient to favor a given theory over others, and that NFL challenges our ability to give a purely epistemic justification for using other traditional epistemic virtues in theory choice. In addition, I argue that the natural way to overcome NFL's challenge is to use non-epistemic values. If my argument holds, non-epistemic values are entangled in theory choice regardless of human limitations and regardless of the subject matter. Thereby, my argument overcomes objections to the main lines of argument revealing the role of values in theory choice. At the end of the paper, I argue that, contrary to common conception, the epistemic challenge arising from NFL is distinct from Hume's problem of induction and other forms of underdetermination. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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