The evidence approach to paraconsistency versus the paraconsistent approach to evidence.
In this paper, we analyze the epistemic approach to paraconsistency. This approach is advanced as an alternative to dialetheism on what concerns interpreting paraconsistency and contradictions; instead of having to accept that there are true contradictions (as dialetheists argue), it is suggested th...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 198; no. 12; pp. 11537 - 11560 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Dec2021
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=152624505&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 152624505 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 198 iid: 12 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 152624505 10.1007/s11229-020-02813-x ppf: 11537 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 325KB tig: atl: The evidence approach to paraconsistency versus the paraconsistent approach to evidence. aug: au: Arenhart, Jonas Rafael Becker affil: Department of Philosophy, Federal University of Santa Catarina, Campus Universitário Reitor João David Ferreira Lima, Trindade, 88040-900, Florianópolis, SC, Brazil Institut Wiener Kreis, Universität Wien, Alserstrasse 23 Top 32, 1080, Vienna, Austria su: Contradiction Logic sug: subj: Contradiction Logic keyword: Contradictions Dialetheism Evidence Logic as modeling Paraconsistent logics ab: In this paper, we analyze the epistemic approach to paraconsistency. This approach is advanced as an alternative to dialetheism on what concerns interpreting paraconsistency and contradictions; instead of having to accept that there are true contradictions (as dialetheists argue), it is suggested that we may understand such situations as involving only conflicting evidence, which restricts contradictions to a notion of evidence weaker than truth. In this paper, we first distinguish two conflicting programs entangled in the proposal: (1) interpreting paraconsistency in general through the notion of evidence, and (2) modeling reasoning with evidence by using paraconsistent logic. The first part of the program, we argue, does not succeed, on the grounds that it does not lead to a uniform proposal to the understanding of paraconsistency, and fails to engage with dialetheism in a legitimate dispute about interpretation of paraconsistency. Also, when seen through the lights of the second kind of approach, a 'logic as modeling' approach, weaknesses of dealing with evidence through paraconsistency come to light, basically because evidence does not seem to suggest the need of a paraconsistent treatment. As a result, one can neither approach paraconsistency in general through evidence, nor approach evidence with the use of paraconsistent logics. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|