You say you want a revolution: two notions of probabilistic independence.
Branden Fitelson and Alan Hájek have suggested that it is finally time for a "revolution" in which we jettison Kolmogorov's axiomatization of probability, and move to an alternative like Popper's. According to these authors, not only did Kolmogorov fail to give an adequate analysis of conditional pr...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 178; no. 10; pp. 3319 - 3352 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Oct2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=152768388&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 152768388 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2021 vid: 178 iid: 10 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 152768388 10.1007/s11098-021-01603-6 ppf: 3319 ppct: 33 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 491KB tig: atl: You say you want a revolution: two notions of probabilistic independence. aug: au: Meehan, Alexander affil: Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, 08544, Princeton, NJ, USA su: Mixture distributions (Probability theory) Fitelson, Branden Easwaran, Kenny Epistemics Theory of knowledge sug: subj: Mixture distributions (Probability theory) Fitelson, Branden Easwaran, Kenny Epistemics Theory of knowledge keyword: Conditional probability Kolmogorov's foundations Null conditioning Probabilistic independence Proper regular conditional distributions ab: Branden Fitelson and Alan Hájek have suggested that it is finally time for a "revolution" in which we jettison Kolmogorov's axiomatization of probability, and move to an alternative like Popper's. According to these authors, not only did Kolmogorov fail to give an adequate analysis of conditional probability, he also failed to give an adequate account of another central notion in probability theory: probabilistic independence. This paper defends Kolmogorov, with a focus on this independence charge. I show that Kolmogorov's sophisticated theory of conditional distributions, advocated by authors such as Kenny Easwaran but often overlooked by philosophers, has the resources to define the notion of independence Fitelson and Hájek seek. I then argue that Kolmogorov's original definition of independence, once suitably reinterpreted as capturing a slight logical weakening of this notion, is not so problematic after all. Indeed, rather than discarding Kolmogorov's definition, we should make room for two distinct notions of probabilistic independence, one stronger and one weaker, which play different theoretical roles. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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