Informational value of challenging an incumbent prosecutor.
Popular elections are used to select prosecutors in most U.S. states. It has been questioned whether voters have the knowledge or incentive to identify quality individuals. In 2011, New York State instituted a series of salary increases for judges. Prosecutors' salaries are tied to judicial compensa...
| Publicado en: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 88; no. 2; pp. 568 - 587 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2021
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=153053224&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 153053224 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2021 vid: 88 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 153053224 10.1002/soej.12527 ppf: 568 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 1.9MB tig: atl: Informational value of challenging an incumbent prosecutor. aug: su: New York (State) Elections Information asymmetry Incumbency (Public officers) Wage increases Prosecutors Voters Information modeling sug: subj: Elections Information asymmetry New York (State) Incumbency (Public officers) Wage increases Prosecutors Voters Information modeling keyword: election incumbent prosecutor salary voting election incumbent prosecutor salary voting ab: Popular elections are used to select prosecutors in most U.S. states. It has been questioned whether voters have the knowledge or incentive to identify quality individuals. In 2011, New York State instituted a series of salary increases for judges. Prosecutors' salaries are tied to judicial compensation by law so that an exogenous shock arose. I develop a simple asymmetric information model where a better informed insider can choose to contest the incumbent. Theory predicts that if voters are updating beliefs in a sophisticated manner, then in equilibrium there is not a change in the rate at which incumbents are challenged. When they are challenged, though, incumbents receive more electoral support. Results from the quasi‐natural experiment are consistent with the theory. The incumbent's vote margin grows by ~6 percentage points after the salary increase and the probability an incumbent wins a contested re‐election increases by 33%. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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