Vertical innovation, foreign direct investment, and asymmetric imitation: A welfare analysis of intellectual property protection.
The paper examines the intertemporal welfare effects of strengthening intellectual property (IP) protection in the South using a North–South quality‐ladder model, where South‐bound foreign direct investment (FDI) serves as a bridge to transfer production from the North to the South. Modeling feature...
| Published in: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 88; no. 2; pp. 789 - 828 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2021
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=153053229&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 153053229 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2021 vid: 88 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 153053229 10.1002/soej.12533 ppf: 789 ppct: 39 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 4.7MB tig: atl: Vertical innovation, foreign direct investment, and asymmetric imitation: A welfare analysis of intellectual property protection. aug: su: Intellectual property Foreign investments sug: subj: Intellectual property International Trade Financing Foreign investments keyword: creative destruction foreign direct investment imitation intellectual property North–South welfare quality ladder transitional dynamics creative destruction foreign direct investment imitation intellectual property North–South welfare quality ladder transitional dynamics ab: The paper examines the intertemporal welfare effects of strengthening intellectual property (IP) protection in the South using a North–South quality‐ladder model, where South‐bound foreign direct investment (FDI) serves as a bridge to transfer production from the North to the South. Modeling features include costly FDI, asymmetric productivity between multinational and Southern firms, and asymmetric imitation risks confronting multinational and Northern firms. In contrast to the literature, the paper shows that strengthening Southern IP protection cannot serve the Southern interest, although it can promote vertical innovation and South‐bound FDI. The North may reap a welfare gain, but it depends on whether Northern households are a dominant equity owner of Northern and multinational firms or whether the IP‐determined imitation risks are not too much biased towards multinational firms. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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