Unconscious perception and central coordinating agency.
One necessary condition on any adequate account of perception is clarity regarding whether unconscious perception exists. The issue is complicated, and the debate is growing in both philosophy and science. In this paper we consider the case for unconscious perception, offering three primary achievem...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 178; no. 12; pp. 3869 - 3894 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Dec2021
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=153184656&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 153184656 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 178 iid: 12 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 153184656 10.1007/s11098-021-01629-w ppf: 3869 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 305KB tig: atl: Unconscious perception and central coordinating agency. aug: au: Shepherd, Joshua Mylopoulos, Myrto affil: Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, K1S 5B6, Ottawa, ON, Canada University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain su: Subliminal perception Philosophy & science Metacognition Skepticism Philosophical theology sug: subj: Subliminal perception Philosophy & science Metacognition Skepticism Philosophical theology keyword: Agency Control Dorsal stream Perception Unconscious perception ab: One necessary condition on any adequate account of perception is clarity regarding whether unconscious perception exists. The issue is complicated, and the debate is growing in both philosophy and science. In this paper we consider the case for unconscious perception, offering three primary achievements. First, we offer a discussion of the underspecified notion of central coordinating agency, a notion that is critical for arguments that purportedly perceptual states are not attributable to the individual, and thus not genuinely perceptual. We develop an explication of what it is for a representational state to be available to central coordinating agency for guidance of behavior. Second, drawing on this explication, we place a more careful understanding of the attributability of a state to the individual in the context of a range of empirical work on vision-for-action, saccades, and skilled typing. The results place pressure on the skeptic about unconscious perception. Third, reflecting upon broader philosophical themes running through debates about unconscious perception, we highlight how our discussion places pressure on the view that perception is a manifest kind, rather than a natural kind. In doing so, we resist the tempting complaint that the debate about unconscious perception is merely verbal. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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