What theoretical equivalence could not be.
Formal criteria of theoretical equivalence are mathematical mappings between specific sorts of mathematical objects, notably including those objects used in mathematical physics. Proponents of formal criteria claim that results involving these criteria have implications that extend beyond pure mathe...
| Published in: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 178; no. 12; pp. 4119 - 4150 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Dec2021
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=153184666&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 153184666 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 178 iid: 12 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 153184666 10.1007/s11098-021-01639-8 ppf: 4119 ppct: 31 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 332KB tig: atl: What theoretical equivalence could not be. aug: au: Teitel, Trevor affil: Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts and Science, University of Toronto, Jackman Humanities Building, 4th Floor, 170 St. George Street, M5R 2M8, Toronto, ON, Canada su: Mathematical mappings Metaphysics Mathematical physics Logical positivism Coherence (Philosophy) sug: subj: Mathematical mappings Metaphysics Mathematical physics Logical positivism Coherence (Philosophy) keyword: Metaphysical realism Representation Substantivalism Theoretical equivalence ab: Formal criteria of theoretical equivalence are mathematical mappings between specific sorts of mathematical objects, notably including those objects used in mathematical physics. Proponents of formal criteria claim that results involving these criteria have implications that extend beyond pure mathematics. For instance, they claim that formal criteria bear on the project of using our best mathematical physics as a guide to what the world is like, and also have deflationary implications for various debates in the metaphysics of physics. In this paper, I investigate whether there is a defensible view according to which formal criteria have significant non-mathematical implications, of these sorts or any other, reaching a chiefly negative verdict. Along the way, I discuss various foundational issues concerning how we use mathematical objects to describe the world when doing physics, and how this practice should inform metaphysics. I diagnose the prominence of formal criteria as stemming from contentious views on these foundational issues, and endeavor to motivate some alternative views in their stead. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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