Constrained Pseudo-Market Equilibrium.
We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical constraints due to considerations of diversity in school choice, or scheduling in course allocation; and other forms of constraints needed to...
| Publicado en: | American Economic Review Vol. 111; no. 11; pp. 3699 - 3733 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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American Economic Association
Nov2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=153242349&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 153242349 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00028282 AER jtl: American Economic Review issn: 00028282 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Nov2021 vid: 111 iid: 11 pid: 22 pub: American Economic Association artinfo: ui: 153242349 10.1257/aer.20201769 ppf: 3699 ppct: 34 formats: tig: atl: Constrained Pseudo-Market Equilibrium. aug: au: Echenique, Federico Miralles, Antonio Zhang, Jun affil: Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology Department of Economics, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona Graduate School of Economics and Università degli Studi di Messina Institute for Social and Economic Research, Nanjing Audit University su: School choice Resource allocation Assignment problems (Programming) Equilibrium Diversity in education sug: subj: School choice Resource allocation Assignment problems (Programming) Equilibrium Diversity in education ab: We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical constraints due to considerations of diversity in school choice, or scheduling in course allocation; and other forms of constraints needed to model, for example, the market for roommates, combinatorial assignment problems, and knapsack constraints. Constraints give rise to pecuniary externalities, which are internalized via prices. Agents pay to the extent that their purchases affect the value the of relevant constraints at equilibrium prices. The result is a constrained-efficient market-equilibrium outcome. The outcome is fair to the extent that constraints treat agents symmetrically. (JEL D47, D61, D63, I11, I21) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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