Consensus Building and Its Epistemic Conditions.

Most of the epistemological debate on disagreement tries to develop standards that describe which actions or beliefs would be rational under specific circumstances in a controversy. To build things on a firm foundation, much work starts from certain idealizations—for example the assumption that part...

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Publicado en:Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 40; no. 5; pp. 1173 - 1187
Autor principal: Hoffmann, Michael H. G.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Nov2021
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Hoffmann, Michael H. G.
        affil: School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology, 685 Cherry Street, N.W., DM Smith Building, 30332-0345, Atlanta, GA, USA
      su: Conflict management
      sug:
        subj: Conflict management
      keyword:
        Consensus
        Deep disagreement
        Epistemology of disagreement
        Fogelin
        Framing
        Intractable conflicts
        Reflective consensus building
        Reframing
      ab: Most of the epistemological debate on disagreement tries to develop standards that describe which actions or beliefs would be rational under specific circumstances in a controversy. To build things on a firm foundation, much work starts from certain idealizations—for example the assumption that parties in a disagreement share all the evidence that is relevant and are equal with regard to their abilities and dispositions. This contribution, by contrast, focuses on a different question and takes a different route. The question is: What should people actually do who find themselves in deep disagreement with others? And instead of building theory on some "firm foundation," the paper starts from a specific goal—building consensus by creating new proposals—and asks, first, which actions are suitable to achieve this goal and, second, what are the epistemic conditions of these actions. With regard to the latter, the paper focuses on what has been called framing and reframing in conflict research, and argues that both metaphors need and deserve a suitable epistemological conceptualization.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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    language: English
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