On self-deception: from the perspective of Zhu Xi's moral psychology.

In order to construct a satisfactory theory of cheng-yi 誠意 (making thoughts sincere), Zhu Xi 朱熹 develops an account of how self-deception (zi-qi 自欺) is possible—a profound problem that has puzzled many philosophers. In Zhu's opinion, zhi 知 (knowing) can be divided into two categories: a priori knowi...

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Publicado en:Asian Philosophy Vol. 31; no. 4; pp. 414 - 430
Autor principal: Wang, Kaili
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Taylor & Francis Ltd Nov2021
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        10.1080/09552367.2021.1911384
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        atl: On self-deception: from the perspective of Zhu Xi's moral psychology.
      aug:
        au: Wang, Kaili
        affil: Department of Philosophy, Xiamen University, Xiamen, Fujian P.R. China
      su:
        Zhu Xi, 1130-1200
        Self-deception
        Psychology
        Philosophers
        Metaphysics
        A priori
        Possibility
      sug:
        subj:
          Zhu Xi, 1130-1200
          Self-deception
          Psychology
          Philosophers
          Metaphysics
          A priori
          Possibility
      keyword:
        cheng-yi 誠意 (making thoughts sincere)
        moral knowing
        moral practice
        self-deception (zi-qi 自欺)
        Zhu Xi 朱熹
      ab: In order to construct a satisfactory theory of cheng-yi 誠意 (making thoughts sincere), Zhu Xi 朱熹 develops an account of how self-deception (zi-qi 自欺) is possible—a profound problem that has puzzled many philosophers. In Zhu's opinion, zhi 知 (knowing) can be divided into two categories: a priori knowing and empirical knowing. The further division of empirical knowing defines three sorts of self-deception: (1) the self-deception caused by one's ignorance (wu-zhi 無知), (2) the self-deception caused by one's superficial knowing (qian-zhi 淺知), and (3) the self-deception that may occur when one acquires genuine knowledge (zhen-zhi 真知). In this paper, I will construct a theoretical model of self-deception that follows Zhu's criterial definition of self-deception in Daxue Zhangju 大學章句 (Interpretation of The Great Learning), thereby accounting for the possibility of these three sorts of self-deception. Better understanding of Zhu's conception of self-deception could, moreover, open fruitful avenues for further work on his metaphysics and moral psychology.
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    language: English
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