How to be imprecise and yet immune to sure loss.
Towards the end of Decision Theory with a Human Face (2017), Richard Bradley discusses various ways a rational yet human agent, who, due to lack of evidence, is unable to make some fine-grained credibility judgments, may nonetheless make systematic decisions. One proposal is that such an agent can s...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 199; no. 1/2; pp. 427 - 445 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=153650790&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 153650790 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 199 iid: 1/2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 153650790 10.1007/s11229-020-02665-5 ppf: 427 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 421KB tig: atl: How to be imprecise and yet immune to sure loss. aug: au: Steele, Katie affil: School of Philosophy, Australian National University, 2600, Canberra, ACT, Australia su: Decision theory Set functions Decision making Probability theory sug: subj: Decision theory Set functions Decision making Probability theory ab: Towards the end of Decision Theory with a Human Face (2017), Richard Bradley discusses various ways a rational yet human agent, who, due to lack of evidence, is unable to make some fine-grained credibility judgments, may nonetheless make systematic decisions. One proposal is that such an agent can simply "reach judgments" on the fly, as needed for decision making. In effect, she can adopt a precise probability function to serve as proxy for her imprecise credences (or set of probability functions) at the point of decision, and then subsequently abandon the proxy as she proceeds to learn more about the world. Contra Bradley, I argue that an agent who employs this strategy does not necessarily act like a precise Bayesian, since she is not necessarily immune to sure loss in diachronic, as well as synchronic, settings. I go on to suggest a method for determining a proxy probability function (via geometric averaging) whereby the agent does act like a precise Bayesian, so understood. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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