Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk.
The epistemology of risk examines how risks bear on epistemic properties. A common framework for examining the epistemology of risk holds that strength of evidential support is best modelled as numerical probability given the available evidence. In this essay I develop and motivate a rival 'relevant...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 199; no. 1/2; pp. 481 - 512 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=153650792&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 153650792 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 199 iid: 1/2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 153650792 10.1007/s11229-020-02668-2 ppf: 481 ppct: 31 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 410KB tig: atl: Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk. aug: au: Gardiner, Georgi affil: Philosophy Department, University of Tennessee, 801 McClung Tower, 37996, Knoxville, TN, USA su: Theory of knowledge Locus (Mathematics) Diagnosis Skepticism Motivation (Psychology) sug: subj: Theory of knowledge Locus (Mathematics) Diagnosis Skepticism Motivation (Psychology) keyword: Epistemic injustice Moral encroachment Rape accusations Relevant alternatives Risk Stakes ab: The epistemology of risk examines how risks bear on epistemic properties. A common framework for examining the epistemology of risk holds that strength of evidential support is best modelled as numerical probability given the available evidence. In this essay I develop and motivate a rival 'relevant alternatives' framework for theorising about the epistemology of risk. I describe three loci for thinking about the epistemology of risk. The first locus concerns consequences of relying on a belief for action, where those consequences are significant if the belief is false. The second locus concerns whether beliefs themselves—regardless of action—can be risky, costly, or harmful. The third locus concerns epistemic risks we confront as social epistemic agents. I aim to motivate the relevant alternatives framework as a fruitful approach to the epistemology of risk. I first articulate a 'relevant alternatives' model of the relationship between stakes, evidence, and action. I then employ the relevant alternatives framework to undermine the motivation for moral encroachment. Finally, I argue the relevant alternatives framework illuminates epistemic phenomena such as gaslighting and crying wolf, and I draw on the framework to diagnose the undue skepticism endemic to rape accusations. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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