Mental kinematics: dynamics and mechanics of neurocognitive systems.
Dynamical systems play a central role in explanations in cognitive neuroscience. The grounds for these explanations are hotly debated and generally fall under two approaches: non-mechanistic and mechanistic. In this paper, I first outline a neurodynamical explanatory schema that highlights the role...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 199; no. 1/2; pp. 1091 - 1124 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=153650821&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 153650821 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 199 iid: 1/2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 153650821 10.1007/s11229-020-02766-1 ppf: 1091 ppct: 33 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 815KB tig: atl: Mental kinematics: dynamics and mechanics of neurocognitive systems. aug: au: Barack, David L. affil: Presidential Scholar in Society and Neuroscience, Center for Science and Society, Departments of Philosophy, Neuroscience, and Economics, Columbia University, New York, USA su: Kinematics Dynamical systems Cognitive neuroscience Power (Social sciences) sug: subj: Kinematics Dynamical systems Cognitive neuroscience Power (Social sciences) keyword: Explanation Mechanisms ab: Dynamical systems play a central role in explanations in cognitive neuroscience. The grounds for these explanations are hotly debated and generally fall under two approaches: non-mechanistic and mechanistic. In this paper, I first outline a neurodynamical explanatory schema that highlights the role of dynamical systems in cognitive phenomena. I next explore the mechanistic status of such neurodynamical explanations. I argue that these explanations satisfy only some of the constraints on mechanistic explanation and should be considered pseudomechanistic explanations. I defend this argument against three alternative interpretations of the neurodynamical explanatory schema. The independent interpretation holds that neurodynamical explanations and mechanisms are independent. The constitutive interpretation holds that neurodynamical explanations are constitutive but otherwise non-mechanistic. Both the independent and constitutive interpretations fail to account for all the features of neurodynamical explanations. The partial interpretation assumes that the targets of dynamical systems models are mechanisms and so holds that neurodynamical explanations are incomplete because they lack mechanistic details. I contend instead that the targets of those models are dynamical systems distinct from mechanisms and defend this claim against several objections. I conclude with a defense of the pseudomechanistic interpretation and a discussion of the source of their explanatory power in relation to a causal-mechanical description of the world. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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