Shannon + Friston = Content: Intentionality in predictive signaling systems.
What is the content of a mental state? This question poses the problem of intentionality: to explain how mental states can be about other things, where being about them is understood as representing them. A framework that integrates predictive coding and signaling systems theories of cognitive proce...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 199; no. 1/2; pp. 2793 - 2817 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=153650900&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 153650900 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 199 iid: 1/2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 153650900 10.1007/s11229-020-02912-9 ppf: 2793 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 404KB tig: atl: Shannon + Friston = Content: Intentionality in predictive signaling systems. aug: au: Figdor, Carrie affil: Department of Philosophy and Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, USA su: Signal theory Systems theory Normativity (Ethics) Mental representation sug: subj: Signal theory Systems theory Normativity (Ethics) Mental representation keyword: Intentionality Mental content Naturalizing content Predictive coding Signaling systems ab: What is the content of a mental state? This question poses the problem of intentionality: to explain how mental states can be about other things, where being about them is understood as representing them. A framework that integrates predictive coding and signaling systems theories of cognitive processing offers a new perspective on intentionality. On this view, at least some mental states are evaluations, which differ in function, operation, and normativity from representations. A complete naturalistic theory of intentionality must account for both types of intentional state. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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