The conceptual nature of imaginative content.
Imagination is widely thought to come in two varieties: perception-like and belief-like imagination. What precisely sets them apart, however, is not settled. More needs to be said about the features that make one variety perception-like and the other belief-like. One common, although typically impli...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 199; no. 1/2; pp. 3189 - 3206 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=153650917&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 153650917 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 199 iid: 1/2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 153650917 10.1007/s11229-020-02930-7 ppf: 3189 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 285KB tig: atl: The conceptual nature of imaginative content. aug: au: Arcangeli, Margherita affil: Institut Jean Nicod (CNRS-EHESS-ENS), PSL University, École Normale Supérieure, Pavillon Jardin, 29, rue d'Ulm, 75005, Paris, France su: Imagination Motivation (Psychology) sug: subj: Imagination Motivation (Psychology) keyword: Belief-like/cognitive imagination Conceptual content Non-conceptual content Observational concepts Perception-like/sensory imagination ab: Imagination is widely thought to come in two varieties: perception-like and belief-like imagination. What precisely sets them apart, however, is not settled. More needs to be said about the features that make one variety perception-like and the other belief-like. One common, although typically implicit, view is that they mimic their counterparts (perception and belief, respectively) along the conceptuality dimension: while the content of belief-like imagination is fully conceptual, the content of perception-like imagination is fully (or at least partially) non-conceptual. Such a view, however, is not sufficiently motivated in the literature. I will show that there are good reasons to reject it and I will argue that both varieties of imagination involve fully conceptual contents (independently of whether either perception or belief has non-conceptual content). I will suggest an alternative way to draw the distinction between perception-like and belief-like imagination along the conceptuality dimension, according to which only perception-like imagination requires observational concepts. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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