Four ways of (mis-)conceiving embodiment in tool use.
A broader conception of the user's perceptual, cognitive, and motor capabilities considers tools as body extensions. By identifying specific tool-related motor-grounded mechanisms, the embodied approach assumes that this "extensional phenomenon" takes place not only at a behavioral level but also at...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 199; no. 1/2; pp. 3853 - 3880 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=153650945&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 153650945 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 199 iid: 1/2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 153650945 10.1007/s11229-020-02960-1 ppf: 3853 ppct: 27 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 414KB tig: atl: Four ways of (mis-)conceiving embodiment in tool use. aug: au: Osiurak, François Federico, Giovanni affil: Laboratoire d'Etude des Mécanismes Cognitifs, Université de Lyon, Lyon, France Institut Universitaire de France, Paris, France Laboratoire d'Etude des Mécanismes Cognitifs (EA 3082), Institut de Psychologie, 5, Avenue Pierre Mendès-France, 69676, Bron Cedex, France Laboratory of Experimental Psychology, Suor Orsola Benincasa University, Naples, Italy su: Conception Hypothesis sug: subj: Conception Hypothesis keyword: Action observation Manipulation knowledge Perception and action Technical reasoning Tool incorporation Tool use ab: A broader conception of the user's perceptual, cognitive, and motor capabilities considers tools as body extensions. By identifying specific tool-related motor-grounded mechanisms, the embodied approach assumes that this "extensional phenomenon" takes place not only at a behavioral level but also at a psychological level. At least four ways of conceiving embodiment in tool use have been offered in relation to the concepts of incorporation, perception, knowledge, and observation. Nevertheless, the validity of these conceptions has been rarely, if not never, assessed. In this article, we attempt to fill this gap by discussing each of these conceptions in turn, with the aim of determining whether it is justified to consider tools as detached objects of a special sort in embodied terms. We argue that tool incorporation is made possible by "distalization", that is, an embodied mechanism specific to tool use. Nevertheless, there is neither empirical nor theoretical support for the hypothesis that specific tool-related embodied mechanisms are involved in perception, knowledge, and observation. In broad terms, there is a tendency in the literature to overinterpret tool use as an embodied phenomenon at a psychological level. Inevitably, this limitation leads us to under-intellectualize the underlying cognitive processes and, as a result, it prevents us from understanding the technical-reasoning skills that allow humans to transform dramatically the physical world. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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