How autism shows that symptoms, like psychiatric diagnoses, are 'constructed': methodological and epistemic consequences.
Critics who are concerned over the epistemological status of psychiatric diagnoses often describe them as being constructed. In contrast, those critics usually see symptoms as relatively epistemologically unproblematic. In this paper I show that symptoms are also constructed. To do this I draw upon...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 199; no. 1/2; pp. 4499 - 4523 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=153650972&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 153650972 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 199 iid: 1/2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 153650972 10.1007/s11229-020-02988-3 ppf: 4499 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 662KB tig: atl: How autism shows that symptoms, like psychiatric diagnoses, are 'constructed': methodological and epistemic consequences. aug: au: Fellowes, Sam affil: Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, County South Lancaster University, LA1 4YL, Lancaster, UK su: Psychiatric diagnosis Symptoms Autism Autistic children sug: subj: Psychiatric diagnosis Symptoms Autism Autistic children keyword: Constructivism Psychiatric diagnoses Psychiatric symptoms Realism ab: Critics who are concerned over the epistemological status of psychiatric diagnoses often describe them as being constructed. In contrast, those critics usually see symptoms as relatively epistemologically unproblematic. In this paper I show that symptoms are also constructed. To do this I draw upon the demarcation between data and phenomena. I relate this distinction to psychiatry by portraying behaviour of individuals as data and symptoms as phenomena. I then draw upon philosophers who consider phenomena to be constructed to argue that symptoms are also constructed. Rather than being ready made in the world I show how symptoms are constructs we apply to the world. I highlight this with a historical example and describe methodological constraints on symptom construction. I show the epistemic problems with psychiatric diagnoses are also applicable to symptoms. Following this, I suggest that critics of psychiatric diagnoses should extend their criticism to symptoms or, if they still believe symptoms are relatively epistemologically unproblematic, should rethink their concerns over psychiatric diagnoses. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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