Weighing in on decisions in the brain: neural representations of pre-awareness practical intention.
Neuroscientists have located brain activity that prepares or encodes action plans before agents are aware of intending to act. On the basis of these findings and broader agency research, activity in these regions has been proposed as the neural realizers of practical intention. My aim in this paper...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 199; no. 1/2; pp. 5175 - 5204 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=153651004&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 153651004 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 199 iid: 1/2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 153651004 10.1007/s11229-020-03020-4 ppf: 5175 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 728KB tig: atl: Weighing in on decisions in the brain: neural representations of pre-awareness practical intention. aug: au: Waller, Robyn Repko affil: Department of Philosophy and Neuroscience Program, Iona College, New Rochelle, NY, USA su: Intention Act (Philosophy) Agent (Philosophy) Practical reason sug: subj: Intention Act (Philosophy) Agent (Philosophy) Practical reason keyword: Intentional action Intentions Neuroscience Practical reasoning Representation ab: Neuroscientists have located brain activity that prepares or encodes action plans before agents are aware of intending to act. On the basis of these findings and broader agency research, activity in these regions has been proposed as the neural realizers of practical intention. My aim in this paper is to evaluate the case for taking these neural states to be neural representations of intention. I draw on work in philosophy of action on the role and nature of practical intentions to construct a framework of the functional profile of intentions fit for empirical investigation. With this framework, I turn to the broader empirical neuroscience literature on agency to assess these proposed neural representations of intention. I argue that while these neural states in some respects satisfy the functions of intention in planning agency prospective of action, their fit with the role of intention in action execution is not well supported. I close by offering a sketch of which experimental task features could aid in the search for the neural realizer of intention in action. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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