Supertropestantivalism.
According to the identity version of spacetime supersubstantivalism, material objects are numerically identical to spacetime regions. While the view has been commended for its parsimony and concordance with physics, it has not properly been assessed in light of the metaphysics of properties. The pre...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 71; no. 4; pp. 1 - 24 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Oct2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=153655863&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 153655863 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318094 PHQ jtl: Philosophical Quarterly issn: 00318094 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2021 vid: 71 iid: 4 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 153655863 10.1093/pq/pqaa080 ppf: 1 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 235KB tig: atl: Supertropestantivalism. aug: au: Giberman, Daniel su: Spacetime Nonexistent objects (Philosophy) Tropes (Philosophy) Ontology Metaphysics sug: subj: Spacetime Nonexistent objects (Philosophy) Tropes (Philosophy) Ontology Metaphysics keyword: bare particulars properties spacetime substance supersubstantivalism tropes ab: According to the identity version of spacetime supersubstantivalism, material objects are numerically identical to spacetime regions. While the view has been commended for its parsimony and concordance with physics, it has not properly been assessed in light of the metaphysics of properties. The present essay fills this void by discerning several subspecies of identity supersubstantivalism, corresponding to various property ontologies. Finding them all wanting, the essay develops and defends a novel brand of supersubstantivalism based on the trope ontology. On this view, here dubbed 'supertropestantivalism', regions are pluralities of geometrically and topologically alike tropes, some of which bundle together as material objects. The resulting picture is not itself an identity version of supersubstantivalism, but it retains the originally attractive features of the identity version while avoiding the shortcomings of competing ontologies. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews. item: Philosophical Quarterly holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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