Subject, Object, and Knowledge as First-Person.
This article tries to show that focusing on why and how subject and object are distinct is of key importance for understanding the nature of knowledge itself. It argues that: 1) cognition starts with an aliud which is present to a felt self in a way fundamentally different from one's own modes of be...
| Publicado en: | Grazer Philosophische Studien Vol. 98; no. 4; pp. 516 - 530 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Brill Academic Publishers
2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=153926697&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 153926697 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01659227 NFG jtl: Grazer Philosophische Studien issn: 01659227 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2021 vid: 98 iid: 4 pid: 639 pub: Brill Academic Publishers artinfo: ui: 153926697 10.1163/18756735-00000143 ppf: 516 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 296KB tig: atl: Subject, Object, and Knowledge as First-Person. aug: au: Antognazza, Maria Rosa affil: Department of Philosophy, King's College London, London, UK su: Self Awareness sug: subj: Self Awareness keyword: first person object self self-knowledge subject ab: This article tries to show that focusing on why and how subject and object are distinct is of key importance for understanding the nature of knowledge itself. It argues that: 1) cognition starts with an aliud which is present to a felt self in a way fundamentally different from one's own modes of being; 2) individual human knowledge in its paradigmatic form is essentially first-personal, that is, its object-directedness requires a built-in, implicit awareness of a 'self' that provides the unifying perspective from which the aliud is apprehended; 3) this is a first-order awareness which is crucially distinct from the second-order awareness which requires a reflexive cognitive act – a distinction which the author proposes to cash out in terms of 'first-person knowledge' versus 'self-knowledge. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Grazer Philosophische Studien is the property of Brill Academic Publishers and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Grazer Philosophische Studien holder: Brill Academic Publishers dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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