Against 'functional gravitational energy': a critical note on functionalism, selective realism, and geometric objects and gravitational energy.
The present paper revisits the debate between realists about gravitational energy in GR (who opine that gravitational energy can be said to meaningfully exist in GR) and anti-realists/eliminativists (who deny this). I re-assess the arguments underpinning Hoefer's seminal eliminativist stance, and th...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 199; no. 2; pp. 299 - 334 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2021 Supplement 2
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=153929233&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 153929233 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 Supplement 2 vid: 199 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 153929233 10.1007/s11229-019-02503-3 ppf: 299 ppct: 35 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 510KB tig: atl: Against 'functional gravitational energy': a critical note on functionalism, selective realism, and geometric objects and gravitational energy. aug: au: Duerr, Patrick M. affil: Oriel College, University of Oxford, Oriel Square, OX1 4EW, Oxford, Oxfordshire, UK su: Gravitational energy Philosophy of mind Realism General relativity (Physics) sug: subj: Gravitational energy Philosophy of mind Realism General relativity (Physics) keyword: Conservation laws Energy Functionalism General relativity ab: The present paper revisits the debate between realists about gravitational energy in GR (who opine that gravitational energy can be said to meaningfully exist in GR) and anti-realists/eliminativists (who deny this). I re-assess the arguments underpinning Hoefer's seminal eliminativist stance, and those of their realist detractors' responses. A more circumspect reading of the former is proffered that discloses where the so far not fully appreciated, real challenges lie for realism about gravitational energy. I subsequently turn to Lam and Read's recent proposals for such a realism. Their arguments are critically examined. Special attention is devoted to the adequacy of Read's appeals to functionalism, imported from the philosophy of mind. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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