Counterpossible Reasoning in Physics.

This article explores three ways in which physics may involve counterpossible reasoning. The first way arises when evaluating false theories: to say what the world would be like if the theory were true, we need to evaluate counterfactuals with physically impossible antecedents. The second way relate...

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Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 88; no. 5; pp. 1113 - 1125
Autor principal: Wilson, Alastair
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Dec2021
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      ab: This article explores three ways in which physics may involve counterpossible reasoning. The first way arises when evaluating false theories: to say what the world would be like if the theory were true, we need to evaluate counterfactuals with physically impossible antecedents. The second way relates to the role of counterfactuals in characterizing causal structure: to say what causes what in physics, we need to make reference to physically impossible scenarios. The third way is novel: to model metaphysical dependence in physics, we need to consider counterfactual consequences of metaphysical impossibilities. Physics accordingly bears substantial and surprising counterpossible commitments.
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