Causal Pluralism in Philosophy: Empirical Challenges and Alternative Proposals.
An increasing number of arguments for causal pluralism invoke empirical psychological data. Different aspects of causal cognition—specifically, causal perception and causal inference—are thought to involve distinct cognitive processes and representations, and they thereby distinctively support trans...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 88; no. 5; pp. 761 - 773 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Dec2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=153950442&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 153950442 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 88 iid: 5 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 153950442 10.1086/714878 ppf: 761 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 88KB tig: atl: Causal Pluralism in Philosophy: Empirical Challenges and Alternative Proposals. aug: au: Ngoc Dinh, Phuong Danks, David su: Pluralism Mental representation Causal inference Cognition Cognitive science sug: subj: Pluralism Mental representation Causal inference Cognition Cognitive science ab: An increasing number of arguments for causal pluralism invoke empirical psychological data. Different aspects of causal cognition—specifically, causal perception and causal inference—are thought to involve distinct cognitive processes and representations, and they thereby distinctively support transference and dependency theories of causation, respectively. We argue that this dualistic picture of causal concepts arises from methodological differences, rather than from an actual plurality of concepts. Hence, philosophical causal pluralism is not particularly supported by the empirical data. Serious engagement with cognitive science reveals that the connection between psychological concepts of causation and philosophical notions is substantially more complicated than is traditionally presumed. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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