Fritz London and the measurement problem: a phenomenological approach.

In this paper, I discuss the possible relations between Fritz London's account of the status of the observer in quantum physics and transcendental phenomenology. Firstly, I discuss Steven French's interpretation of London's thesis as a phenomenological account of the status of the observer, along wi...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Continental Philosophy Review Vol. 54; no. 4; pp. 453 - 482
Autor principal: Alves, Pedro M. S.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Dec2021
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
Descripción
Sumario:In this paper, I discuss the possible relations between Fritz London's account of the status of the observer in quantum physics and transcendental phenomenology. Firstly, I discuss Steven French's interpretation of London's thesis as a phenomenological account of the status of the observer, along with the objections Otávio Bueno has brought forward. Secondly, refusing in part both French's and Bueno's theses for several reasons, I propose another way of reading London's thesis in the framework of transcendental phenomenology. Namely, I put London's account of the observer against the backdrop of Husserl's analyses of the objectifying acts and objectual constitution. Finally, I end this article with some criticisms of what seems to me the ontological indigency of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics, to whose "spirit" London also belongs.