No Substances in a Substance.
In this paper I analyze the most controversial thesis of Aristotelian substantialism, namely, that substances cannot be composed of other substances. I call this position the Mereological Limitation Thesis (MLT). I find MLT valid and defend it. My argument for MLT is a version of the argument from t...
| Publicado en: | Philosophia Vol. 49; no. 5; pp. 2243 - 2264 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Nov2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=153978469&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 153978469 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00483893 1VPF jtl: Philosophia issn: 00483893 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Nov2021 vid: 49 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 153978469 10.1007/s11406-021-00358-y ppf: 2243 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 617KB tig: atl: No Substances in a Substance. aug: au: Piwowarczyk, Marek affil: The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Lublin, Poland su: Aristotelianism (Philosophy) Ingarden, Roman, 1893-1970 Metaphysics Philosophers Denkel, Arda sug: subj: Aristotelianism (Philosophy) Ingarden, Roman, 1893-1970 Metaphysics Philosophers Denkel, Arda keyword: Accidents Compound substances Form Identity-dependence Matter One-many problem Parts ab: In this paper I analyze the most controversial thesis of Aristotelian substantialism, namely, that substances cannot be composed of other substances. I call this position the Mereological Limitation Thesis (MLT). I find MLT valid and defend it. My argument for MLT is a version of the argument from the unicity of substantial form. Every substance can have only one substantial form, thus, if some substances compose the object O, then what binds them is only a set of their accidental forms (relations) and in the result thereof O is not a substance (O is not informed by a substantial form). I argue against the relativization of the substantiality of forms to the level of composition by showing that substantial forms must be absolutely identity-independent. In the last section I specify the ontological status of parts of substances and argue that they are spatially distributed bundles of accidents of a compound substance itself. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophia is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophia holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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