Should We Protect Animals from Hate Speech?†.

Laws against hate speech protect members of certain human groups. However, they do not offer protection to nonhuman animals. Using racist hate speech as our primary example, we explore the discrepancy between the legal response to hate speech targeting human groups and what might be called anti-anim...

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Publicado en:Oxford Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 41; no. 4; pp. 1149 - 1173
Autores principales: Milburn, Josh, Cochrane, Alasdair
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / USA Winter2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Should We Protect Animals from Hate Speech?†.
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          Milburn, Josh
          Cochrane, Alasdair
      su:
        Hate speech
        Hate crimes
        Freedom of speech
        Animal rights
        Animal laws
      sug:
        subj:
          Hate speech
          Hate crimes
          Freedom of speech
          Animal rights
          Animal laws
      ab: Laws against hate speech protect members of certain human groups. However, they do not offer protection to nonhuman animals. Using racist hate speech as our primary example, we explore the discrepancy between the legal response to hate speech targeting human groups and what might be called anti-animal or speciesist hate speech. We explore two sets of possible defences of this legal discrepancy drawn from the philosophical literature on hate speech—non-consequentialist and harm-based—and find both wanting. We thus conclude that, absent a compelling alternative argument, there is no in-principle reason to support the censure of racist hate speech but not the censure of speciesist hate speech.
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