case for moral empiricism.

It is an old and venerable idea in philosophy that morality is built into us, and this nativist view has seen a resurgence of late. Indeed, the prevailing systematic account of how we acquire complex moral representations is a nativist view inspired by arguments in Chomskyan linguistics. In this art...

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Publicado en:Analysis Vol. 81; no. 3; pp. 549 - 568
Autor principal: Nichols, Shaun
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / USA Jul2021
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Nichols, Shaun
        affil: Cornell University Ithaca , NY, USA
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        Empiricism
        Nativism
        Statistical learning
        Linguistics
        Philosophers
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          Empiricism
          Nativism
          Statistical learning
          Linguistics
          Philosophers
      ab: It is an old and venerable idea in philosophy that morality is built into us, and this nativist view has seen a resurgence of late. Indeed, the prevailing systematic account of how we acquire complex moral representations is a nativist view inspired by arguments in Chomskyan linguistics. In this article, I review the leading argument for moral nativism – the poverty of the moral stimulus. I defend a systematic empiricist alternative that draws on the resources of statistical learning. Such an empiricist account, I argue, promises to explain much of the complexity of people's moral and other normative attitudes.
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