Evaluative experiences: the epistemological significance of moral phenomenology.
Recently, a number of phenomenological approaches to experiential justification emerged according to which an experience's justificatory force is grounded in the experience's distinctive phenomenology. The basic idea is that certain experiences exhibit a presentive phenomenology and that they are a...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 199; no. 3/4; pp. 5747 - 5769 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=154096701&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 154096701 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 199 iid: 3/4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 154096701 10.1007/s11229-021-03044-4 ppf: 5747 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 651KB tig: atl: Evaluative experiences: the epistemological significance of moral phenomenology. aug: au: Berghofer, Philipp affil: Department for Philosophy, University of Graz, Heinrichstraße 26/5, 8010, Graz, Austria su: Phenomenology Ethics Intuition Theory of knowledge Reproductive technology sug: subj: Phenomenology Ethics Intuition Theory of knowledge Reproductive technology keyword: Epistemic intuition Epistemology Evaluative experience Meta-ethics Moral emotion Moral perception Myth of the given ab: Recently, a number of phenomenological approaches to experiential justification emerged according to which an experience's justificatory force is grounded in the experience's distinctive phenomenology. The basic idea is that certain experiences exhibit a presentive phenomenology and that they are a source of immediate justification precisely by virtue of their presentive phenomenology. Such phenomenological approaches usually focus on perceptual experiences and mathematical intuitions. In this paper, I aim at a phenomenological approach to ethical experiences. I shall show that we need to make a distinction between evaluative experiences directed at concrete cases and ethical intuitions directed at general principles. The focus will be on evaluative experiences. I argue that evaluative experiences constitute a sui generis type of experience that gain their justificatory force by virtue of their presentive evaluative phenomenology. In Sect. 1, I introduce and motivate the phenomenological idea that certain experiences exhibit a justification-conferring phenomenology. In Sect. 4, I apply this idea to morally evaluative experiences. In Sect. 5, I suggest that certain epistemic intuitions should be considered epistemically evaluative experiences and I outline a strong parallelism between ethics and epistemology. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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