Another way logic might be normative.
Is logic normative for reasoning? In the wake of work by Gilbert Harman and John MacFarlane, this question has been reduced to: are there any adequate bridge principles which link logical facts to normative constraints on reasoning? Hitherto, defenders of the normativity of logic have exclusively fo...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 199; no. 3/4; pp. 5861 - 5882 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=154096706&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 154096706 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 199 iid: 3/4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 154096706 10.1007/s11229-021-03049-z ppf: 5861 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 337KB tig: atl: Another way logic might be normative. aug: au: Evershed, J. W. affil: Department of Philosophy, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK su: Logic Normativity (Ethics) sug: subj: Logic Normativity (Ethics) keyword: Bridge principles Logic and reasoning Normativity of logic Philosophy of logic ab: Is logic normative for reasoning? In the wake of work by Gilbert Harman and John MacFarlane, this question has been reduced to: are there any adequate bridge principles which link logical facts to normative constraints on reasoning? Hitherto, defenders of the normativity of logic have exclusively focussed on identifying adequate validity bridge principles: principles linking validity facts—facts of the form Γ ⊧ φ —to normative constraints on reasoning. This paper argues for two claims. First, for the time being at least, Harman's challenge cannot be surmounted by articulating validity bridge principles. Second, Harman's challenge can be met by articulating invalidity bridge principles: principles linking invalidity facts of the form Γ ⊭ ψ to normative constraints on reasoning. In doing so, I provide a novel defence of the normativity of logic. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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