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On the possibility of non-eternalism without absolute simultaneity.

It has been argued that the standard formulation of the Special Theory of Relativity (hereafter STR) is not only incompatible with presentism, but also strongly indicates the truth of eternalism. We should, however, distinguish two claims concerning the ontological implications of STR: (1) STR is in...

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Published in:Synthese Vol. 199; no. 3/4; pp. 5885 - 5899
Main Author: Amiriara, Hassan
Format: Article
Published: Springer Nature Dec2021
Subjects:
Special relativity (Physics)
Possibility
Spacetime
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        10.1007/s11229-021-03050-6
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        atl: On the possibility of non-eternalism without absolute simultaneity.
      aug:
        au: Amiriara, Hassan
        affil: Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Tehran, Iran
      su:
        Special relativity (Physics)
        Possibility
        Spacetime
      sug:
        subj:
          Special relativity (Physics)
          Possibility
          Spacetime
      keyword:
        Eternalism
        Ontology of time
        Simultaneity
        Special theory of relativity
        Substantivalism
      ab: It has been argued that the standard formulation of the Special Theory of Relativity (hereafter STR) is not only incompatible with presentism, but also strongly indicates the truth of eternalism. We should, however, distinguish two claims concerning the ontological implications of STR: (1) STR is inconsistent with every ontology which requires an absolute relation of simultaneity; and (2) STR implies that eternalism is the only possible ontology of time. There have been a wide range of responses designed to reject these claims, both jointly and independently. For example, one way of rejecting claim (2) is by rejecting claim (1): thus, one would argue that STR can be revised or interpreted in such a way that it allows an absolute relation of simultaneity. Another way of rejecting claim (2) is by questioning the equivalency of the relation 'being real as of' (a relation known in the literature as relation R). The main purpose of this paper is to raise a new line of objection against concluding eternalism from the relativity of simultaneity. I argue that there is a way to deny claim (2) without denying claim (1) and also without denying the equivalency of relation R. The argument which I present rests on a metaphysical assumption concerning the relation of simultaneity (hereafter the SIM): the assumption that the SIM holds basically between space–time points as opposed to holding basically between events.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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