Epistemic feelings, metacognition, and the Lima problem.
Epistemic feelings like tip-of-the-tongue experiences, feelings of knowing, and feelings of confidence tell us when a memory can be recalled and when a judgment was correct. Thus, they appear to be a form of metacognition, but a curious one: they tell us about content we cannot access, and the infor...
| Published in: | Synthese Vol. 199; no. 3/4; pp. 6803 - 6826 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Dec2021
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=154096748&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 154096748 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 199 iid: 3/4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 154096748 10.1007/s11229-021-03094-8 ppf: 6803 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 668KB tig: atl: Epistemic feelings, metacognition, and the Lima problem. aug: au: Greely, Nathaniel affil: Department of Philosophy, University of California San Diego, La Jolla, California, USA su: Metacognition Emotions Confidence Heuristic Argument Lima (Peru) sug: subj: Lima (Peru) Metacognition Emotions Confidence Heuristic Argument keyword: Epistemic feelings Evaluativism Feelings of confidence Feelings of knowing Introspection Tip-of-the-tongue experiences ab: Epistemic feelings like tip-of-the-tongue experiences, feelings of knowing, and feelings of confidence tell us when a memory can be recalled and when a judgment was correct. Thus, they appear to be a form of metacognition, but a curious one: they tell us about content we cannot access, and the information is supplied by a feeling. Evaluativism is the claim that epistemic feelings are components of a distinct, primitive metacognitive mechanism that operates on its own set of inputs. These inputs are heuristics that correlate with the presence of mental content that can't be accessed directly. I will argue that evaluativism is unmotivated, unsupported, and ill-conceived. I will critique the philosophical and empirical arguments for evaluativism and conclude that there is no reason to posit a distinct mechanism to explain epistemic feelings. I will conclude, however, that epistemic feelings may constitute a nonconceptual form of metacognition, which if true is a significant claim. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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