Modeling intentional agency: a neo-Gricean framework.

This paper analyzes three contrasting strategies for modeling intentional agency in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and action, and draws parallels between them and similar strategies of scientific model-construction. Gricean modeling involves identifying primitive building blocks of intent...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 199; no. 3/4; pp. 7003 - 7031
Autor principal: Sarkia, Matti
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Dec2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Modeling intentional agency: a neo-Gricean framework.
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        au: Sarkia, Matti
        affil: Department of Political and Economic Studies, University of Helsinki, Unioninkatu 40 A 514, 00014, Helsinki, Finland
      su:
        Agent (Philosophy)
        Philosophy of mind
        Act (Philosophy)
        Analytic philosophy
        Heuristic
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        subj:
          Agent (Philosophy)
          Philosophy of mind
          Act (Philosophy)
          Analytic philosophy
          Heuristic
      keyword:
        Intentional agency
        Philosophical methodology
        Philosophical naturalism
        Philosophy of mind and action
        Scientific modeling
      ab: This paper analyzes three contrasting strategies for modeling intentional agency in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and action, and draws parallels between them and similar strategies of scientific model-construction. Gricean modeling involves identifying primitive building blocks of intentional agency, and building up from such building blocks to prototypically agential behaviors. Analogical modeling is based on picking out an exemplary type of intentional agency, which is used as a model for other agential types. Theoretical modeling involves reasoning about intentional agency in terms of some domain-general framework of lawlike regularities, which involves no detailed reference to particular building blocks or exemplars of intentional agency (although it may involve coarse-grained or heuristic reference to some of them). Given the contrasting procedural approaches that they employ and the different types of knowledge that they embody, the three strategies are argued to provide mutually complementary perspectives on intentional agency.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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