First-person representations and responsible agency in AI.
In this paper I investigate which of the main conditions proposed in the moral responsibility literature are the ones that spell trouble for the idea that Artificial Intelligence Systems (AISs) could ever be full-fledged responsible agents. After arguing that the standard construals of the control a...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 199; no. 3/4; pp. 7061 - 7080 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=154096759&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 154096759 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 199 iid: 3/4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 154096759 10.1007/s11229-021-03105-8 ppf: 7061 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 646KB tig: atl: First-person representations and responsible agency in AI. aug: au: Sebastián, Miguel Ángel affil: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, Universidad Autónoma de México, Circuito Mtro Mario de la Cueva, Ciudad Universitaria, Del. Coyoacán, 04510, Mexico City, Mexico su: Agent (Philosophy) Artificial intelligence Responsibility Moral agent (Philosophy) Consciousness Multiagent systems sug: subj: Agent (Philosophy) Artificial intelligence Responsibility Moral agent (Philosophy) Consciousness Multiagent systems keyword: De Se representation First-person representation Moral agency Moral responsibility ab: In this paper I investigate which of the main conditions proposed in the moral responsibility literature are the ones that spell trouble for the idea that Artificial Intelligence Systems (AISs) could ever be full-fledged responsible agents. After arguing that the standard construals of the control and epistemic conditions don't impose any in-principle barrier to AISs being responsible agents, I identify the requirement that responsible agents must be aware of their own actions as the main locus of resistance to attribute that kind of agency to AISs. This is because this type of awareness is thought to involve first-person or de se representations, which, in turn, are usually assumed to involve some form of consciousness. I clarify what this widespread assumption involves and conclude that the possibility of AISs' moral responsibility hinges on what the correct theory of de se representations ultimately turns out to be. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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