Scientific conclusions need not be accurate, justified, or believed by their authors.
We argue that the main results of scientific papers may appropriately be published even if they are false, unjustified, and not believed to be true or justified by their author. To defend this claim we draw upon the literature studying the norms of assertion, and consider how they would apply if one...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 199; no. 3/4; pp. 8187 - 8204 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Dec2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=154096808&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 154096808 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 199 iid: 3/4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 154096808 10.1007/s11229-021-03158-9 ppf: 8187 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 547KB tig: atl: Scientific conclusions need not be accurate, justified, or believed by their authors. aug: au: Dang, Haixin Bright, Liam Kofi affil: The School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science, Botany House, University of Leeds, LS2 9JT, Leeds, UK Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, Lakatos Building, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, WC2A 2AE, London, UK su: Social epistemology Scientific discoveries Twentieth century Scientific communication Authors sug: subj: Social epistemology Scientific discoveries Twentieth century Scientific communication Authors keyword: Norms of assertion Science communication Social epistemology of science ab: We argue that the main results of scientific papers may appropriately be published even if they are false, unjustified, and not believed to be true or justified by their author. To defend this claim we draw upon the literature studying the norms of assertion, and consider how they would apply if one attempted to hold claims made in scientific papers to their strictures, as assertions and discovery claims in scientific papers seem naturally analogous. We first use a case study of William H. Bragg's early twentieth century work in physics to demonstrate that successful science has in fact violated these norms. We then argue that features of the social epistemic arrangement of science which are necessary for its long run success require that we do not hold claims of scientific results to their standards. We end by making a suggestion about the norms that it would be appropriate to hold scientific claims to, along with an explanation of why the social epistemology of science—considered as an instance of collective inquiry—would require such apparently lax norms for claims to be put forward. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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