Scoring, truthlikeness, and value.

There is an ongoing debate about which rule we ought to use for scoring probability estimates. Much of this debate has been premised on scoring-rule monism, according to which there is exactly one best scoring rule. In previous work, I have argued against this position. The argument given there was...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 199; no. 3/4; pp. 8281 - 8299
Autor principal: Douven, Igor
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Dec2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Douven, Igor
        affil: IHPST/CNRS/Panthéon–Sorbonne, Paris, France
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        Intuition
        Monism
        A priori
        Argument
        Hypothesis
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          Intuition
          Monism
          A priori
          Argument
          Hypothesis
      keyword:
        Forecasts
        Scoring rules
        Truthlikeness
        Value
      ab: There is an ongoing debate about which rule we ought to use for scoring probability estimates. Much of this debate has been premised on scoring-rule monism, according to which there is exactly one best scoring rule. In previous work, I have argued against this position. The argument given there was based on purely a priori considerations, notably the intuition that scoring rules should be sensitive to truthlikeness relations if, and only if, such relations are present among whichever hypotheses are at issue. The present paper offers a new, quasi-empirical argument against scoring-rule monism. This argument uses computational simulations to show that different scoring rules can have different economical consequences, depending on the context of use.
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    language: English
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