Reichenbach, Russell and scientific realism.
This paper considers how to best relate the competing accounts of scientific knowledge that Russell and Reichenbach proposed in the 1930s and 1940s. At the heart of their disagreements are two different accounts of how to best combine a theory of knowledge with scientific realism. Reichenbach argued...
| Published in: | Synthese Vol. 199; no. 3/4; pp. 8485 - 8507 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Dec2021
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=154096822&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 154096822 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 199 iid: 3/4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 154096822 10.1007/s11229-021-03172-x ppf: 8485 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 590KB tig: atl: Reichenbach, Russell and scientific realism. aug: au: Pincock, Christopher affil: Department of Philosophy, Ohio State University, Columbus, USA su: Realism Theory of knowledge Scientific knowledge Empiricism sug: subj: Realism Theory of knowledge Scientific knowledge Empiricism keyword: Conventionalism Justification of induction Probability Scientific realism ab: This paper considers how to best relate the competing accounts of scientific knowledge that Russell and Reichenbach proposed in the 1930s and 1940s. At the heart of their disagreements are two different accounts of how to best combine a theory of knowledge with scientific realism. Reichenbach argued that a broadly empiricist epistemology should be based on decisions. These decisions or "posits" informed Reichenbach's defense of induction and a corresponding conception of what knowledge required. Russell maintained that a scientific realist must abandon empiricism in favor of knowledge of some non-demonstrative principles with a non-empirical basis. After identifying the best versions of realism offered by Reichenbach and Russell, the paper concludes with a brief discussion of the limitations of these two approaches. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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