Causation and cognition: an epistemic approach.

Kaplan and Craver (Philos Sci 78(4):601–627, 2011) and Piccinini and Craver (Synthese, 183(3):283–311, 2011) argue that only mechanistic explanations of cognition are genuine causal explanations, because only evidence of mechanisms reveals the causal structure of cognition. I first argue that this c...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 199; no. 3/4; pp. 9133 - 9161
Autor principal: Taylor, Samuel D.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Dec2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Taylor, Samuel D.
        affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK
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        Cognition
        Cognitive science
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        subj:
          Cognition
          Cognitive science
      keyword:
        Causation
        Epistemic causality
        Evidence
        Mechanistic explanation
        Nonmechanistic explanation
      ab: Kaplan and Craver (Philos Sci 78(4):601–627, 2011) and Piccinini and Craver (Synthese, 183(3):283–311, 2011) argue that only mechanistic explanations of cognition are genuine causal explanations, because only evidence of mechanisms reveals the causal structure of cognition. I first argue that this claim is grounded in a commitment to the mechanistic account of causality, which cannot be endorsed by a defender of causal-nonmechanistic explanations. Then, I defend the epistemic theory of causality, which holds that causal explanations are not genuine to the extent that they reveal mechanistic causal structure, but, rather, to the extent that they have evidential support and yield successful prediction, explanation, and control inferences. Finally, I enact an epistemic unification of causal explanation in cognitive science, according to which both mechanistic and nonmechanistic explanations of cognition can be genuine causal explanations.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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