Causation and cognition: an epistemic approach.
Kaplan and Craver (Philos Sci 78(4):601–627, 2011) and Piccinini and Craver (Synthese, 183(3):283–311, 2011) argue that only mechanistic explanations of cognition are genuine causal explanations, because only evidence of mechanisms reveals the causal structure of cognition. I first argue that this c...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 199; no. 3/4; pp. 9133 - 9161 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=154096847&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 154096847 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 199 iid: 3/4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 154096847 10.1007/s11229-021-03197-2 ppf: 9133 ppct: 28 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 467KB tig: atl: Causation and cognition: an epistemic approach. aug: au: Taylor, Samuel D. affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK su: Cognition Cognitive science sug: subj: Cognition Cognitive science keyword: Causation Epistemic causality Evidence Mechanistic explanation Nonmechanistic explanation ab: Kaplan and Craver (Philos Sci 78(4):601–627, 2011) and Piccinini and Craver (Synthese, 183(3):283–311, 2011) argue that only mechanistic explanations of cognition are genuine causal explanations, because only evidence of mechanisms reveals the causal structure of cognition. I first argue that this claim is grounded in a commitment to the mechanistic account of causality, which cannot be endorsed by a defender of causal-nonmechanistic explanations. Then, I defend the epistemic theory of causality, which holds that causal explanations are not genuine to the extent that they reveal mechanistic causal structure, but, rather, to the extent that they have evidential support and yield successful prediction, explanation, and control inferences. Finally, I enact an epistemic unification of causal explanation in cognitive science, according to which both mechanistic and nonmechanistic explanations of cognition can be genuine causal explanations. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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