Artifacts and mind-dependence.

I defend the intention-dependence of artifacts (IDA), which says that something is an artifact of kind K only if it is the successful product of an intention to make an artifact of kind K. I consider objections from two directions. First, that artifacts are often mind- and intention-dependent, but t...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 199; no. 3/4; pp. 9313 - 9337
Autor principal: Juvshik, Tim
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Dec2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Artifacts and mind-dependence.
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        au: Juvshik, Tim
        affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Amherst, MA, USA
      su:
        Mass production
        Error analysis in mathematics
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          Mass production
          Error analysis in mathematics
      keyword:
        Accidental making
        Artifacts
        Automated production
        Intentions
        Mind-dependence
      ab: I defend the intention-dependence of artifacts (IDA), which says that something is an artifact of kind K only if it is the successful product of an intention to make an artifact of kind K. I consider objections from two directions. First, that artifacts are often mind- and intention-dependent, but that this isn't necessary, as shown by swamp cases. I offer various error theories for why someone would have artifact intuitions in such cases. Second, that while artifacts are necessarily mind-dependent, they aren't necessarily intention-dependent. I consider and reject three kinds of cases which purport to show this: accidental creation, automated production, and mass production. I argue that intentions are present in all of these cases, but not where we would normally expect.
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    language: English
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