Neither mindful nor mindless, but minded: habits, ecological psychology, and skilled performance.
A widely shared assumption in the literature about skilled motor behavior is that any action that is not blindly automatic and mechanical must be the product of computational processes upon mental representations. To counter this assumption, in this paper we offer a radical embodied (non-representat...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 199; no. 3/4; pp. 10109 - 10134 |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Dec2021
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=154096887&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 154096887 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 199 iid: 3/4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 154096887 10.1007/s11229-021-03238-w ppf: 10109 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 703KB tig: atl: Neither mindful nor mindless, but minded: habits, ecological psychology, and skilled performance. aug: au: Segundo-Ortin, Miguel Heras-Escribano, Manuel affil: Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Faculty of Humanities, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands Department of Philosophy I, University of Granada, Granada, Spain su: Environmental psychology Habit Mental representation Automatic pilot (Airplanes) Intelligent tutoring systems sug: subj: Environmental psychology Habit Mental representation Automatic pilot (Airplanes) Intelligent tutoring systems keyword: Affordances Direct perception Ecological psychology Habits Information Radical embodied cognition Skilled action ab: A widely shared assumption in the literature about skilled motor behavior is that any action that is not blindly automatic and mechanical must be the product of computational processes upon mental representations. To counter this assumption, in this paper we offer a radical embodied (non-representational) account of skilled action that combines ecological psychology and the Deweyan theory of habits. According to our proposal, skilful performance can be understood as composed of sequences of mutually coherent, task-specific perceptual-motor habits. Such habits play a crucial role in simplifying both our exploration of the perceptual environment and our decision-making. However, we argue that what keeps habits situated, precluding them from becoming rote and automatic, are not mental representations but the agent's conscious attention to the affordances of the environment. It is because the agent is not acting on autopilot but constantly searching for new information for affordances that she can control her behavior, adapting previously learned habits to the current circumstances. We defend that our account provides the resources needed to understand how skilled action can be intelligent (flexible, adaptive, context-sensitive) without having any representational cognitive processes built into them. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|