Opacity thought through: on the intransparency of computer simulations.

Computer simulations are often claimed to be opaque and thus to lack transparency. But what exactly is the opacity of simulations? This paper aims to answer that question by proposing an explication of opacity. Such an explication is needed, I argue, because the pioneering definition of opacity by P...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 199; no. 3/4; pp. 11643 - 11667
Autor principal: Beisbart, Claus
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Dec2021
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Beisbart, Claus
        affil: Institute of Philosophy, University of Bern, Länggassstrasse 49a, 3012, Bern, Switzerland
      su: Computer simulation
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        subj: Computer simulation
      keyword:
        Epistemology of computer simulation
        Modeling
        Understanding why
        Unsurveyability
        Verification of simulations
      ab: Computer simulations are often claimed to be opaque and thus to lack transparency. But what exactly is the opacity of simulations? This paper aims to answer that question by proposing an explication of opacity. Such an explication is needed, I argue, because the pioneering definition of opacity by P. Humphreys and a recent elaboration by Durán and Formanek are too narrow. While it is true that simulations are opaque in that they include too many computations and thus cannot be checked by hand, this doesn't exhaust what we might want to call the opacity of simulations. I thus make a fresh start with the natural idea that the opacity of a method is its disposition to resist knowledge and understanding. I draw on recent work on understanding and elaborate the idea by a systematic investigation into what type of knowledge and what type of understanding are required if opacity is to be avoided and why the required sort of understanding, in particular, is difficult to achieve. My proposal is that a method is opaque to the degree that it's difficult for humans to know and to understand why its outcomes arise. This proposal allows for a comparison between different methods regarding opacity. It further refers to a kind of epistemic access that is important in scientific work with simulations.
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