Perceptual illusionism.

Perceptual illusionism is the view that perceptual experience is, in general, radically illusory. That is, perceptual experience presents objects as having certain sensible properties and standing in certain sensible relations, but nothing in the subject's environment has those properties or stands...

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Publicado en:Analytic Philosophy Vol. 62; no. 4; pp. 396 - 418
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Dec2021
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      ab: Perceptual illusionism is the view that perceptual experience is, in general, radically illusory. That is, perceptual experience presents objects as having certain sensible properties and standing in certain sensible relations, but nothing in the subject's environment has those properties or stands in those relations. This paper makes the case for perceptual illusionism by showing how a broad set of philosophical and scientific considerations converge to support illusionism about the full range of sensible properties and relations. After clarifying the illusionist thesis, I set out the argument in three parts. First, I briefly make the case for an illusionist view of color. I then argue for illusionism about the spatial/temporal properties presented in experience on the assumption that some "radical" view of space (and/or time) is correct—that is, some view according to which nothing like our ordinary three‐dimensional space (or four‐dimensional spacetime) exists at the fundamental level. Finally, I argue that there is a strong case for illusionism even if all radical views turn out to be false..
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