Justice in epistemic gaps: The 'proof paradox' revisited.
This paper defends the heretical view that sometimes we ought to assign legal liability based on statistical evidence alone. Recent literature focuses on potential unfairness to the defending party if we rely on bare statistics. Here, I show that capitulating in response to 'epistemic gaps'—cases wh...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Issues Vol. 31; no. 1; pp. 315 - 334 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=154273098&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 154273098 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 15336077 1731 jtl: Philosophical Issues issn: 15336077 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Oct2021 vid: 31 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 154273098 10.1111/phis.12193 ppf: 315 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 350KB tig: atl: Justice in epistemic gaps: The 'proof paradox' revisited. aug: su: Legal liability Civil law Negligence Paradox sug: subj: Legal liability Civil law Negligence Paradox ab: This paper defends the heretical view that sometimes we ought to assign legal liability based on statistical evidence alone. Recent literature focuses on potential unfairness to the defending party if we rely on bare statistics. Here, I show that capitulating in response to 'epistemic gaps'—cases where there is a group of potential harmers but an absence of individuating evidence—can amount to a serious injustice against the party who has been harmed. Drawing on prominent civil law litigation involving pharmaceutical and industrial negligence, the overall aim is to illustrate moral pitfalls stemming from the popular idea that it is never appropriate to rely on bare statistics when settling a legal dispute. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophical Issues is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophical Issues holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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