Private contracts in two‐sided platforms.
We study a platform that signs private contracts with sellers. Contractual secrecy implies interrelated hold‐up problems for buyers and sellers that reduce platform profits and welfare. By increasing its control over sellers' prices, the platform is able to increase price transparency and commit to...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 52; no. 4; pp. 815 - 839 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2021
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=154346573&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 154346573 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 52 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 154346573 10.1111/1756-2171.12392 ppf: 815 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 475KB tig: atl: Private contracts in two‐sided platforms. aug: au: Llanes, Gastón Ruiz‐Aliseda, Francisco affil: School of Business, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile su: Contracts Market power Price increases Erosion sug: subj: Contracts Market power Price increases Erosion ab: We study a platform that signs private contracts with sellers. Contractual secrecy implies interrelated hold‐up problems for buyers and sellers that reduce platform profits and welfare. By increasing its control over sellers' prices, the platform is able to increase price transparency and commit to not behaving opportunistically, which increases profits and welfare. Thus, policy prescriptions for dealing with contractual secrecy are reversed in the case of two‐sided platforms. We also find a platform may benefit from an erosion of its market power on one side of the market because this erosion may raise the surplus it offers the other side. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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