On the pragmatic and epistemic virtues of inference to the best explanation.

In a series of papers over the past twenty years, and in a new book, Igor Douven (sometimes in collaboration with Sylvia Wenmackers) has argued that Bayesians are too quick to reject versions of inference to the best explanation that cannot be accommodated within their framework. In this paper, I su...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 199; no. 5/6; pp. 12407 - 12439
Autor principal: Pettigrew, Richard
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Dec2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Pettigrew, Richard
        affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
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        Virtue epistemology
        Explanation
        Argument
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          Virtue epistemology
          Explanation
          Argument
      keyword:
        Abduction
        Accuracy
        Bayesianism
        Credences
        Dutch Book argument
        Dutch Strategy argument
        Evidence
        Inference to the best explanation
        Pragmatic arguments
      ab: In a series of papers over the past twenty years, and in a new book, Igor Douven (sometimes in collaboration with Sylvia Wenmackers) has argued that Bayesians are too quick to reject versions of inference to the best explanation that cannot be accommodated within their framework. In this paper, I survey their worries and attempt to answer them using a series of pragmatic and purely epistemic arguments that I take to show that Bayes' Rule really is the only rational way to respond to your evidence.
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