Video on demand: what deepfakes do and how they harm.

This paper defends two main theses related to emerging deepfake technology. First, fears that deepfakes will bring about epistemic catastrophe are overblown. Such concerns underappreciate that the evidential power of video derives not solely from its content, but also from its source. An audience ma...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 199; no. 5/6; pp. 13373 - 13392
Autor principal: Harris, Keith Raymond
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Dec2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=154480418&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 154480418
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00397857
        4LI
      jtl: Synthese
      issn: 00397857
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Dec2021
      vid: 199
      iid: 5/6
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        154480418
        10.1007/s11229-021-03379-y
      ppf: 13373
      ppct: 19
      formats:
        fmt:
          @attributes:
            type: P
            size: 554KB
      tig:
        atl: Video on demand: what deepfakes do and how they harm.
      aug:
        au: Harris, Keith Raymond
        affil: Philosophy Department, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, USA
      su:
        Deepfakes
        Video on demand
        Social epistemology
      sug:
        subj:
          Deepfakes
          Video on demand
          Social epistemology
      keyword:
        Deception
        Pornography
        Testimony
        Trust
      ab: This paper defends two main theses related to emerging deepfake technology. First, fears that deepfakes will bring about epistemic catastrophe are overblown. Such concerns underappreciate that the evidential power of video derives not solely from its content, but also from its source. An audience may find even the most realistic video evidence unconvincing when it is delivered by a dubious source. At the same time, an audience may find even weak video evidence compelling so long as it is delivered by a trusted source. The growing prominence of deepfake content is unlikely to change this fundamental dynamic. Thus, through appropriate patterns of trust, whatever epistemic threat deepfakes pose can be substantially mitigated. The second main thesis is that focusing on deepfakes that are intended to deceive, as epistemological discussions of the technology tend to do, threatens to overlook a further effect of this technology. Even where deepfake content is not regarded by its audience as veridical, it may cause its viewers to develop psychological associations based on that content. These associations, even without rising to the level of belief, may be harmful to the individuals depicted and more generally. Moreover, these associations may develop in cases in which the video content is realistic, but the audience is dubious of the content in virtue of skepticism toward its source. Thus, even if—as I suggest—epistemological concerns about deepfakes are overblown, deepfakes may nonetheless be psychologically impactful and may do great harm.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Synthese
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2021
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N