Agential thinking.

In his 2009 monograph, Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection, Peter Godfrey-Smith accuses biologists of demonstrating 'Darwinian Paranoia' when they engage in what he dubs 'agential thinking'. But as Daniel Dennett points out, he offers neither an illuminating set of examples nor an extended a...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 199; no. 5/6; pp. 13393 - 13420
Autor principal: Veit, Walter
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Dec2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=154480419&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 154480419
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00397857
        4LI
      jtl: Synthese
      issn: 00397857
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Dec2021
      vid: 199
      iid: 5/6
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        154480419
        10.1007/s11229-021-03380-5
      ppf: 13393
      ppct: 27
      formats:
        fmt:
          @attributes:
            type: P
            size: 733KB
      tig:
        atl: Agential thinking.
      aug:
        au: Veit, Walter
        affil: University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
      su:
        Dennett, Daniel Clement, 1942-
        Natural selection
        Biologists
        Paranoia
        Propaganda
      sug:
        subj:
          Dennett, Daniel Clement, 1942-
          Natural selection
          Biologists
          Paranoia
          Propaganda
      keyword:
        Agency
        Agential thinking
        Intentional stance
      ab: In his 2009 monograph, Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection, Peter Godfrey-Smith accuses biologists of demonstrating 'Darwinian Paranoia' when they engage in what he dubs 'agential thinking'. But as Daniel Dennett points out, he offers neither an illuminating set of examples nor an extended argument for this assertion, deeming it to be a brilliant propaganda stroke against what is actually a useful way of thinking. Compared to the dangers of teleological thinking in biology, the dangers of agential thinking have unfortunately rarely been discussed. Drawing on recent work by Samir Okasha, I attempt to remedy this omission, through analyzing the nature of agential thinking, and providing a philosophical treatment of the unexamined dangers in this peculiar, yet tempting way of thinking.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Synthese
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2021
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N