How are fictions given? Conjoining the 'artifactual theory' and the 'imaginary-object theory'.

According to the so-called 'artifactual theory' of fiction, fictional objects are to be considered as abstract artifacts. Within this framework, fictional objects are defined on the basis of their complex dependence on literary works, authors, and readership. This theory is explicitly distinguished...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 199; no. 5/6; pp. 13749 - 13770
Autor principal: Summa, Michela
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Dec2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=154480434&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 154480434
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00397857
        4LI
      jtl: Synthese
      issn: 00397857
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Dec2021
      vid: 199
      iid: 5/6
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        154480434
        10.1007/s11229-021-03396-x
      ppf: 13749
      ppct: 21
      formats:
        fmt:
          @attributes:
            type: P
            size: 703KB
      tig:
        atl: How are fictions given? Conjoining the 'artifactual theory' and the 'imaginary-object theory'.
      aug:
        au: Summa, Michela
        affil: Institut für Philosophie, Josef-Stangl-Platz 2, 97070, Würzburg, Germany
      su:
        Fiction
        Phenomenalism
        Ontology
        Readership
        Phenomenology
      sug:
        subj:
          Fiction
          Phenomenalism
          Ontology
          Readership
          Phenomenology
      keyword:
        Constitution
        Givenness
        Imagination
      ab: According to the so-called 'artifactual theory' of fiction, fictional objects are to be considered as abstract artifacts. Within this framework, fictional objects are defined on the basis of their complex dependence on literary works, authors, and readership. This theory is explicitly distinguished from other approaches to fictions, notably from the imaginary-object theory. In this article, I argue that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive but can and should be integrated. In particular, the ontology of fiction can be fruitfully supplemented by a phenomenological analysis, which allows us to clarify the defining modes of givenness of fictional objects. Likewise, based on the results of the artifactual theory, some assumptions in the imaginary-object theory, which are liable to be interpreted as laying the ground to phenomenalism, can be corrected.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Synthese
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2021
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N