The general-relativistic case for super-substantivalism.
Super-substantivalism (of the type we'll consider) roughly comprises two core tenets: (1) the physical properties which we attribute to matter (e.g. charge or mass) can be attributed to spacetime directly, with no need for matter as an extraneous carrier "on top of" spacetime; (2) spacetime is more...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 199; no. 5/6; pp. 13789 - 13823 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Dec2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=154480436&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 154480436 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 199 iid: 5/6 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 154480436 10.1007/s11229-021-03398-9 ppf: 13789 ppct: 34 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 1MB tig: atl: The general-relativistic case for super-substantivalism. aug: au: Duerr, Patrick M. Calosi, Claudio affil: Oriel College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK Institute for Theoretical Philosophy, University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany Department of Philosophy, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland su: Spacetime Theory (Philosophy) Geometric approach sug: subj: Spacetime Theory (Philosophy) Geometric approach keyword: Fundamentality General relativity Geometric approach to spacetime Ontological dependence Super-substantivalism ab: Super-substantivalism (of the type we'll consider) roughly comprises two core tenets: (1) the physical properties which we attribute to matter (e.g. charge or mass) can be attributed to spacetime directly, with no need for matter as an extraneous carrier "on top of" spacetime; (2) spacetime is more fundamental than (ontologically prior to) matter. In the present paper, we revisit a recent argument in favour of super-substantivalism, based on General Relativity. A critique is offered that highlights the difference between (various accounts of) fundamentality and (various forms of) ontological dependence. This affords a metaphysically more perspicuous view of what super-substantivalism's tenets actually assert, and how it may be defended. We tentatively propose a re-formulation of the original argument that not only seems to apply to all classical physics, but also chimes with a standard interpretation of spacetime theories in the philosophy of physics. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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